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Abstract 
This paper aims to shed light on the impacts of imposing co-payment on public 
services, a strategy increasingly employed in the realm of publicly provided healthcare. 
We analyze the effect of imposing a charge for the individual appropriation of common 
resources. In our design, withdrawing the maximum amount is the dominant strategy 
for every player, but the resulting equilibrium is socially inefficient. We find that the 
presence of a price that is small enough to leave intact the conflict between individual 
incentives and collective welfare is not effective in reducing appropriation among 
agents who have previously been acting without it. In fact, the upward trend in the 
average extraction of common funds continues after the introduction of a price. In an 
alternative treatment in which we impose copayment from the outset of the 
experiment, withdrawals are lower than in the free-access baseline. Our results 
provide insights on the conditions for the effectiveness of co-payment in curbing the 
over-consumption of public resources. 
Keywords: Common-pool resources; co-payment; public services; consumer choice.  
JEL Classification: C91, C92, H41, I11, I18 
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1. Introduction 
We propose an experimental investigation of the effect of imposing a price for the 
subtraction of resources from a common fund. Our evidence sheds light on some 
relevant aspects related to the effectiveness of co-payments in curbing the over-
consumption problem, most notably in healthcare services. 
The conflict between individual and collective welfare in common pool extraction 
problems has received attention since the early works by Gordon (1954) and Ostrom et 
al. (1994), among others. We use the common pool resource paradigm as a metaphor 
for publicly available services, whose excessive use by the individuals entitled to access 
it may lead to a collectively inefficient outcome. In other words, the level of individual 
appropriation is detrimental to social welfare. In this context, our main question is: 
does the introduction of a small co-payment reduce individual extraction levels, 
thereby increasing efficiency and social welfare? The limited magnitude of the price is 
designed so that the resulting context preserves intact the social dilemma-type of 
conflict between individual and collective incentives. Can the focus on the price and/or 
the sheer “pain of paying” help maintain a high level of common resources? Or, on the 
contrary, could a “crowding-out” effect arise, whereby potentially prosocial subjects 
feel legitimated by the price to extract more out of the common resource? 
The present policy context in Europe characterizes by efforts to reduce public deficits. 
User charges, often in form of “co-payments”, have been introduced for services that 
were previously provided for free, and exemptions to these charges have been 
reduced. These measures, frequently applied in healthcare policy, entail a direct effect 
of a transfer from users to the public administration, while the main stated goal is to 
reduce the over-consumption of public resources. As we focus on this second aspect, 
we explore the appropriation of resources following the introduction of co-payments 
in comparison with i) a situation in which the co-payment is not introduced and ii) a 
situation where co-payment has always existed, i.e. the resource was never available 
for free. The first comparison relates to many dilemmas currently faced by European 
policy-makers in contexts of socialized healthcare. The second comparison serves 
multiple purposes. On one hand, it shows the effect of the introduction of co-payment 
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as a novelty compared with a stable rules regime. On the other hand, it isolates the 
effect of the habit to consume the good for free. Our evidence also provides insights 
on whether co-payment would be more effective for new goods and services that were 
never publicly available free of charge. 
 
2. Background 
Co-payments in healthcare, implying patients’ obligation to pay a small part of the cost 
of service, represent one of the main examples of access charges in public services. 
They are frequently imposed on primary care visits, on specialized care, and on the 
purchase of pharmaceuticals. In European countries, there are wide variations in terms 
of amounts, calculation methods (percentages, fixed fees, etc.) and with respect to 
which healthcare services are subject to co-payment (Espin and Rovira, 2007). Even 
bigger differences arise when considering the US and Canada (Mas et al., 2011). 
The rationale of co-payments is twofold. First, they might improve the financial 
situation of the payer. In the European context of socialized medicine, this argument 
makes co-payments look unfair, as they cause a transfer of resources from those who 
need more care to the rest of the population. Furthermore, as patients may be unable 
to distinguish the actual benefits, they could reduce the use of effective and ineffective 
healthcare in similar proportions, as shown in the famous RAND experiment in the U.S. 
(Manning and Newhouse, 1987). This may lead to negative health impacts and overall 
higher long-term healthcare expenditure (Gemmill et al., 2008). The second purpose 
consists of tackling the excessive use of resources. Standard economic theory points 
out that rational and selfish people use free services up to the point that they provide 
individual benefits above individual non-monetary costs (e.g. time). From the societal 
perspective, individual incentives lead to over-consumption, as social welfare would be 
maximized if resources were consumed up to the point that marginal benefits (usually 
assumed to be decreasing) equal the social marginal costs of providing them. Thus, 
imposing an access price in public services can contribute towards a better alignment 
of individual and social incentives, thereby ameliorating the over-consumption 
problem. 
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In our experimental design, we observe whether the introduction of a price can 
enhance social efficiency, in a context where experimental subjects have perfect 
information on their own benefit from appropriating public resources, and the 
corresponding cost for the group they belong to. The size of the price is small, in order 
to preserve the typical trade-off between individual and collective benefits. An 
example of a small co-payment is the “euro-per-prescription” applied by the 
government of the Spanish Autonomous Community of Catalonia in 2012. 
In this context, the introduction of a price may modify behavior. As a price is obviously 
higher than zero, if the usage of resources is a “normal” good, the demand effect 
should be negative. The presence of a price may also trigger a “pain of paying” effect, 
whereby the sheer act of paying diminishes the pleasure of consuming a good (Prelec 
and Loewenstein, 1998).  
Possibly, a crowding-out effect may also be triggered by a copayment, whose results 
go towards the opposite direction. As described in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), 
such effects arise whenever people are, in principle, willing to cooperate and take 
socially oriented choices but when confronted with a price, become more “selfish”. 
The presence of a price may shift the focus away from collective costs and suggest that 
the individual can “legitimately” compare her own benefit with the amount she would 
have to spend to access a public resource (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). In this case, 
the individual appropriation of common resources would increase. 
 
3. Experimental design, procedures and predictions 
The experiment took place during the first week of July 2012 at the Laboratory of 
Experimental Economics (LEE) of the University Jaume I, located in Castellón, Spain. A 
total sample of 125 students participated: 35 in the “Baseline” (B) treatment, 30 in the 
“Copay” (C) treatment, and 60 subjects in what we will refer to as the 
“Baseline+Copay” (BC) treatment. Presentations and instructions given to the students 
made no use of the word “co-payment”. Experimental sessions were programmed 
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
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In order to avoid possible doomsday effects, subjects did not know ex ante the total 
number of rounds (30 in each session). At the beginning of each round, subjects were 
put into groups of five subjects each. No subject knew the identity of her fellow group 
members. Subjects did know that, after each round, they would be randomly re-
matched and that, at the end of the experiment they would be paid according to the 
payoff achieved in a single, randomly selected round. The random selection of a single 
round as the basis for payment implies the removal of past accumulated wealth 
effects. Before the beginning of the experiment, we tested subjects’ comprehension of 
the rules with easy questions on payoffs arising from possible combinations of choices 
among group members. 
In treatment B, at the beginning of each round every group is assigned a common fund 
worth 100 euro. Each one of the five group members has the option of withdrawing an 
integer amount between 0 and 10 euro. Each euro withdrawn is transferred to her 
private fund and reduces the common fund by 2 euro. At the end of each round, what 
remains of the common fund is equally shared among the members of the group. 
Therefore, the payoff of a group member is the sum of her private fund and 20% of the 
amount left in the common fund. For example, if Xi is the amount extracted by player i 
from the common fund, player i’s payoff in any given round equals: 
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At the end of each round, each subject knows her own payoffs only, without any 
information regarding the payoffs of the other members of her group. 
In this context, the payoff-maximizing strategy for each player is to withdraw the 
maximum amount permitted, i.e. 10 euro, as each euro taken away from the common 
fund only reduces her share by 2/5, i.e. 0.4 euro. Assuming rationality and selfishness, 
in the Nash equilibrium, each group member withdraws 10 euro so that no amount is 
left in the common fund and each subject gets a payoff of 10 euro in each round, 
including of course the one randomly selected for the final payment. Clearly, the Nash 
equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. In particular, if all members refrain from extracting 
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resources from the common fund, they enjoy a payoff of 20 euro each, i.e. twice as 
much as that obtained in the Nash equilibrium. 
In treatment C, for each euro withdrawn from the common pool, the subject has to 
pay 0.1 euro. All the co-payments enter the common fund and are re-distributed 
among group members. Therefore, player i’s payoff is: 
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It is easy to see that the payoff-maximizing strategy for each subject is still to withdraw 
10 euro. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile is the same as in treatment B, while the 
payoff per subject is still 10 euro per round (recall that the revenues from co-payment 
are redistributed). In the case where no subject withdraws anything from the common 
fund, each subject gets a 20 euro payoff like in the baseline treatment. 
In the BC treatment, during the first 15 rounds subjects play under the same rules as in 
the baseline. Before round 16, all subjects are informed that during the rest of the 
session they will have to pay 0.1 euro per each euro withdrawn, and that all acess 
payments enter the common fund, precisely as in the C treatment. 
 
4. Results 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of average withdrawals in the three treatments. The line 
in the middle corresponds to the split of the session between the first 15 rounds and 
rounds 16-30, where copayment is introduced in the BC treatment. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of average extraction, by treatment. 
Considering that in this experiment the cooperative choice consists in refraining from 
withdrawing funds from the common pool, it is immediate to observe that the pattern 
during the first rounds mirrors the one typically observed in public good games 
(Ledyard, 1995), where cooperation is relatively high in the first round and then decays 
progressively. Figure 2 shows the decreasing trend in the evolution of the common 
fund.  
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the common fund after extraction, by treatment. 
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An already expected pattern of our data is that no significant differences are observed 
between treatments B and BC along the first 15 rounds, where the rules are the same. 
More interestingly, there are no differences in rounds 16-30 either. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) non-parametric test in table 1, showing the differences among 
distributions2, confirms this result. 
Result 1: There are not significant differences in withdrawal levels across treatments B 
and BC. 
Table 1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for differences in distributions among treatments 
Treatments D p-value 
BC vs B 0.0414 0.191 
BC vs C 0.1322 0.000*** 
B vs C 0.1637 0.000*** 
Note: asterisks used for significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
 
This result is noteworthy, as one could expect some impact from changing the rules of 
the game. This evidence, instead, shows that the introduction of the co-payment does 
not help curbing the inefficient appropriation of funds by group members or, at best, 
has a very short-lived effect. 
On the other hand, behavior in treatment C does differ from the other two treatments, 
as also shown by K-S tests in table 1 above. 
Also in figure 1, we observe the evolution of extractions levels. In particular, when a 
co-payment exists from the beginning (treatment C), average extraction increases 
substantially in the first periods (namely from 4.867 units in period 1 to 7.333 units in 
period 4) and then oscillates around 7.5 units, with a minimum of 6.933 units in round 
12 and a peak of 8.167 units in round 20. There is no evidence of an upwards trend of 
extraction in this treatment after the period 6.  
                                                          
2 Null hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the same distribution. 
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In the other two treatments, B and BC, the increase is by no means limited to the first 
rounds and, in particular, goes on in the second part of the session (rounds 16-30), as 
shown in table 2 below.  
The fact that extraction levels remain lower in treatment C during periods 16 to 30 is 
remarkable, especially as rules in periods 16 to 30 are the same in treatments BC and 
in C. 
Result 2: In treatments B and BC withdrawal levels exhibit an increasing trend also 
during the last 15 periods of the session. The level of extraction does not increase 
significantly in treatment C as compared to the other two treatments.  
Table 2 shows an Ordinary Least Square group of panel data models, one for the first 
15 periods (aggregating treatments B and BC3 to compare with C, the only treatment 
with a price) and three models for the last 15 periods, each one aiming at studying the 
statistical significance of treatment differences in individual extraction per period. 
Hence, the dependent variable in each model is individual extraction, including dummy 
variables for each treatment as the main explanatory variables.  
The first regression explores behavior in the first 15 periods. It shows that average 
extractions increase over time (the impact of “Period” is positive) and are significantly 
higher in B+BC than in C.  These results are in line with the expectation that co-
payments entail a negative impact on appropriation behavior. The 
variable Period*B+BC captures the time trend in B+BC with respect to that in C. The 
upward trend is slightly stronger in B+BC as compared to the C, but not to a statistically 
significant level.  
The second regression shows that average extractions during the last 15 periods are 
significantly higher in B and BC than in C.   
 
Result 3: Withdrawal levels are lower over time in treatment C than in the other two 
treatments, both during periods 1-15 and during periods 16-30. 
 
                                                          
3 Henceforth B+BC. 
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Table 2: O.L.S. with dependent variable: y= individual extraction 
Treatment (1) 
Period<15 
(2) 
Period>15 
(3) 
Period>15 
(4) 
Period>15 
B + BC treatments 0.9393 
(3.26)*** 
   
B treatment  0.8614 
(2.98)*** 
0.2583 
(1.02) 
  
 
C treatment   -0.6031  
(-2.27)**  
-0.8614  
(-2.98)*** 
BC treatment  0.6030 
(2.27)** 
 -0.2583 
(-1.02) 
Period 0.1000 0.0170 0.0959 0.0771 
 (3.68***) (0.73) (5.84)*** (3.59)*** 
Period * B  0.0601 -0.0187  
  (1.90)* (-0.69)  
Period * C   -0.0788 -0.6011 
   (-2.77)*** (-1.90)* 
Period *BC  0.0789  0.0187 
  (2.77)***  (0.69) 
Period*B+BC 0.0417    
 (1.34)    
R2 within 0.0901 0.0811 0.0811 0.0811 
R2 between 0.0142 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
R2 overall 0.0533 0.0580 0.0580 0.0580 
Wald chi2(2) 176.71 159.19 159.19 159.19 
Z-score in parentheses 
Note: asterisks used for significance at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) levels. 
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Variable Period*BC captures the time trend in BC with respect to that in treatment C. 
Results show that the upward trend is significantly stronger in BC compared to the C. 
 
Regression (3) shows that average extractions are significantly lower in C than in BC. 
The impact of the variable Period*C is negative and significant, indicating that 
extractions increase slower over time in C compared to treatment BC. 
 
Result 4: The extraction level in treatments B and BC increases at a higher rate than in 
treatment C. 
Results from regression (4) show that the average extraction is significantly lower in C, 
and non-significantly different in BC, than in treatment B. Variable Period*C indicates 
that the extraction increases at a lower rate over time in treatment C compared to the 
baseline B. 
To summarize, in the last 15 periods, we observe that the level of individual extraction 
in treatment C is significantly lower, at 1% level of significance, in comparison to 
treatment B (-0.86 units) and treatment BC (-0.60), while there are no significant 
differences between B and BC. These results confirm the findings stated previously.  
A non-parametric analysis of the three treatments show that the distributions of 
strategies has remained mostly invariant along the 30 period-horizon. In fact, a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test comparing extraction distributions between periods 1 and 5, 
5 and 10, 10 and 15, 15 and 20, 25 and 30, reveal significant differences only between 
periods 1 and 5 of treatments B and C (KS, p=0.019 and p=0,012, respectively) while all 
other comparisons strongly reject distributional differences (KS, p>0.19). 
Figure 3 shows the distributions of the extraction levels over time by treatment. It is 
clear that, in treatment C, there is a higher frequency of zero extraction and a lower 
frequency of full appropriation in comparison with the other two treatments. 
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  Figure 3: Distribution of the extraction levels, by treatment 
Figures 4 and 5 explore more in detail the evolution of the two extreme choices, no 
extraction and full extraction, in the three treatments. 
 
 Figure 4: Frequency of “0 extraction” by treatment 
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Figure 5: Frequency of “full extraction” by treatment 
 
Once again, we observe that behavior in treatment C differs significantly from 
treatments B and BC: Full (zero) extraction choices are more (less) frequent. 
Furthermore, the evolution of strategies shows that the difference tends to increase 
during the second half of the experiment (rounds 16 to 30). We note, in particular, that 
the frequency of full extraction remains roughly stable around 50% in treatment C, 
while it exhibits a clear upward trend in treatments B and BC, indicating the 
convergence to fully non-cooperative outcomes. 
 
5. Discussion 
There is a lively debate on the pros and cons of introducing user charges for access to 
public services, especially in relation to healthcare, traditionally financed by taxes and 
social security contributions in most European countries. 
The most appealing argument in favor of imposing co-payment is the need to reduce 
over-consumption. In our experiment, we explore how subjects behave when they can 
easily perceive that i) their own payoffs increase in their appropriation of public 
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resources and ii) societal costs are higher than their individual benefits from this 
appropriation. 
Our evidence shows that the introduction of a price for each unit extracted from a 
common fund does not reduce withdrawals, unless subjects have never been granted 
before free access to the common resource.   
While we do not observe any negative demand effect, there is also no sign of a 
“crowding-out” of potential cooperation due to the presence of a price. Results in the 
BC treatment show that, under a small co-payment, keeping intact the conflict 
between individual and collective incentives, cooperation decays following a similar 
path as in the Baseline and, in general, with a trend compatible to what is observed in 
most voluntary contribution mechanism public good experiments. 
Extraction levels are lower in the C treatment, with prices from the first round, so that 
the rules are the same as in rounds 16-30 of the BC treatment. While we may expect 
convergence when the rules become identical in treatments C and BC, differences in 
withdrawals remain significant in rounds 16-30.  
We can conclude that even a small price, which leaves intact the individual incentive to 
appropriate common funds, can curb over-consumption provided that it exists from 
the outset. Otherwise, we do find a negative demand effect on the private 
appropriation of common funds, despite the fact that payoff maximization would still 
drive towards the complete depletion of common resources, as the price in this case 
should discourage appropriation among some subjects.  
Seeing the same issue from another point of view, the habit formed while having 
extracted from the resource at no cost in the first place undermines the potential 
effectiveness of introducing a co-payment. 
These observations and the current upwards trend in the imposition of user charges 
leads to a potential research question on the impact of future policy considerations to 
remove co-payments, for instance when and if sustained growth allows to ease 
budgetary pressures.  A new “CB” treatment would show whether restoring free 
access would lead to more, or less, selfish appropriation in comparison both to 
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alternative contexts in which charges are preserved, and in those where they were 
never introduced. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our experimental design isolates the effect of co-payments in a context where subjects 
have complete information regarding the rules of the game and a conflict exists 
between individual and collective incentives, potentially leading to full depletion of 
common funds. 
We find that, following a history of free access, the introduction of a small per 
extraction unit price does not reduce the amount an individual withdraws from a 
common resource, neither in comparison with a case in which an access price is never 
introduced nor with a case in which extraction is initially free of charge and then 
becomes costly. Hence, our evidence indicates that imposing co-payments on 
previously free services does not foster “social cooperation”, in the sense of limiting 
selfish over-consumption. 
On the other hand, an access price does lead to lower extraction levels when it exists 
from the beginning of the session. Remarkably, extraction levels in the Copay 
treatment remain roughly constant after the first few rounds until the end of the 
experiment (round 30). On the contrary, extraction increases steadily in the other two 
treatments, most notably in the last rounds of treatment BC, in which the price is 
introduced after round 15. 
Field experiments by Cárdenas and Ostrom (2004) have inspired a plethora of studies 
showing that a decision maker’s past experience from the real world determines 
behavior in common pool extraction settings. Our findings show that experience from 
the early periods of the experiment can also affect behavior in subsequent periods. 
Specifically, exposure to a completely free access regime renders the use of co-
payment ineffective as a means of reducing over-exploitation of public resources. On 
the contrary, a copayment achieves the desired objectives if not preceded by free 
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access regimes. As said above, it appears that free extraction spoils the future 
effectiveness of a co-payment in reducing over-consumption.  
Some caveats of the present study are in order. First, we do not address the possibility 
that individual benefits are smaller than the co-payment imposed. Of course, in this 
case there would be no conflict, because refraining from using public resources would 
be both individually and collectively optimal.  
Our design does not address the risk of under-consumption. Some people, especially 
the poor, may refrain from using healthcare resources despite the fact that their 
benefits could compensate the social costs of providing healthcare services. In this 
case, not only would equity be hampered but also long-run public expenditure could 
actually increase, for instance through higher costs of hospital services due to 
worsening health conditions in the population. 
Some features of our design may limit the external validity of our findings. In 
particular, for the sake of simplicity, we have chosen a linear payoff function, despite 
the fact that the marginal societal costs of over-consumption may well be increasing 
rather than constant, while marginal benefits could be decreasing. However, we think 
that our simple design is adequate for the analysis of behavior in a situation where 
users understand the key aspects of the trade-off between individual and collective 
interests. 
The investigation on the effects of introducing a price to services previously offered 
free of charge is clearly relevant for policy-making. Our findings indicate that relying on 
the focal effect of price and on the pain of paying per se, even if the quantity is low, 
does not appear justified. On the other hand, our experimental data highlight the 
effectiveness of imposing a price to reduce excessive use of services that have never 
been provided for free. It appears that, in those cases, the presence of co-payments 
does provide an effective nudge to refrain from the full appropriation of a common 
resource. 
Further research is required to ensure the robustness of these findings, for instance by 
varying the payoff parameters or the group size. Another potential research 
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development would focus on the interplay of co-payments with other factors such as 
income inequality and the launch of campaigns to make people aware of the social 
cost of funding healthcare services. Experimental analysis may also shed light on 
behavioral impacts of policy options to remove existing co-payments.  
We believe that experiments can complement both theoretical advances and the 
collection of empirical evidence in relation to the funding of public services affecting 
citizens´ welfare. The possibility to isolate relevant aspects in the lab can help 
developing sound policy-making towards the sustainable provision of high-quality 
services. In this perspective, our evidence casts doubts on the effectiveness of the 
introduction of co-payments on existing, free-of-charge public services for cost-
containment purposes, while setting prices on access to new services could instead 
succeed as a means of limiting over-consumption. 
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Appendix  
Instructions4 (translated from Spanish) 
Welcome to this experiment, thanks a lot for your participation. 
From this moment, please turn off your mobile and you shall not communicate in any 
way with the other participants during the session. Please read these instructions 
carefully and raise your hand if you have any doubts. Your questions will be answered 
privately by one of the organizers of this experiment. 
Depending on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants, you may earn 
an amount of money that will be privately paid to you in cash at the end of the session. 
In each round, each participant will be assigned to a group of 5 members of the room. 
None of the members will know the identity of the other members of the group. The 
group formation process will be carried out randomly and independently at the 
beginning of each round. 
This session will consist of a series of rounds. These instructions are valid throughout 
all rounds. In case something changes during the session, you will be given specific 
instructions. 
Decision-making 
• At the beginning of each round, the group is given a common fund worth 100 
euro. 
• Each group member can withdraw from the common fund an integer between 
0 and 10, to take in into his/her private fund. Each euro transferred to a private 
fund reduces the common fund in 2 euro.  
• [Only for co-payment] For each unit you withdraw from the common fund, you 
have to pay 0.1 p. (a tenth of a euro). For example, if you withdraw 5 euro from 
                                                          
4 These are the instructions for the Baseline. The instructions for treatment BC are the same as in the 
Baseline for the first 15 periods. After round 15, an announcement is given that, from the following 
round, the subject has to pay 0.1 per unit and the amount collected enters the common fund. 
 
21 
the common fund, you have to pay 0.5 euro. This quantity is subtracted from 
your private fund and it goes to the common fund, which will be shared among 
the five members of the group.  
• This decision is taken each round simultaneously by each member of the group. 
• Therefore, at the end of each round the quantity in the common fund will equal 
100 minus the double of all the amounts withdrawn by group members plus 
one fifth of the amounts extracted by the five members of the group. 
Defining as X1, X 2, X 3, X 4, X 5 the amounts withdrawn by the five members of 
the group, the common fund will be: 
Common Fund = 100 - 2X1 - 2X 2 - 2X 3 - 2X4 - 2X5 + 0.1·[X1 + X 2 + X 3 + X4 + X5] 
• At the end of each round, the quantity left in the common fund will be shared 
equally among the five members of the group. 
• Your outcome in the round will be equal to the sum of your private fund and a 
fifth of the quantity left in the common fund. For example, if you are member 
“1” your payoff will be:   
 X1 – 0.1· X1 + 1/5 [100 - 2X1 - 2X 2 - 2X 3 - 2 X 4- 2 X 5 + 0.1(X1+X2+X3+X4+X5)] 
• At the end of each round, the experimentalist will inform you about your 
payoff, indicating how much of it comes from your private fund, and how much 
from the common fund. 
Payoffs 
At the end of the session a random selection will pick the round that will determine 
your payoff in the experiment. The amount will be privately paid in cash at the end of 
the session.  
The instructions for the Baseline are the same except the parts making reference to 
the 0.1 euro that is paid and its impact on the common fund. The instructions for the 
Baseline+Copay are the same as in the Baseline. After round 15 an announcement is 
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given that, from the following round, the subject has to pay 0.1 per unit and the 
amount collected enters the common fund. 
 
 
QUESTIONS 
1. If you withdraw €7 from the common fund, how much is the reduction in the 
common fund? 
2. For each unit you withdraw from the common fund, how much does each 
group member lose assuming that the rest of the members do not withdraw? 
How much do you gain, considering the impact on your share of the common 
fund and on your private fund? 
3. If each member withdraws €0 from the common fund, how much does each 
group member get at the end of the round? 
4. If each member withdraws €5 from the common fund, how much does each 
group member get at the end of the round? 
5. If each member withdraws €10 from the common fund, how much does each 
group member get at the end of the round? 
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